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Language presupposes an enchronic
infrastructure for social interaction
N. J . ENFIELD AND JACK SIDNELL
8.1 Introduction
While some approaches to language evolution have been thoroughly linguistic yet
without becoming particularly social, others have had the opposite problem. Coming
out of an ethological tradition of research on primate social systems, Robin Dunbar
hypothesized that language arose in our species as a way of managing or servicing
social relationships, in a way analogous to physical grooming in apes and monkeys
(Dunbar 1993, 1996b). The approach is grounded in research on the maintenance of
social relations in complex social groups, but it has failed to gain traction in
linguistics because, linguists say, the argument ‘does not say anything about the
intricate grammatical structures of human languages’ (Hurford 1999: 182). ‘While
language is used for social “grooming” purposes,’ says Hurford, ‘this emphasis fails to
account for the impressive and subtle referential power of language’ (1999: 186). The
sentiment points to a deep disconnect between the social and the linguistic in current
research of relevance to language evolution. Either the researcher is handling the
technicalities of language without really grasping what is going on socially, or vice
versa. In this chapter, we want to draw attention to a sorely needed solution to this
problem, taking as a starting point the behaviour of social interaction from a
technical point of view, and seeing what language looks like from there.
8.2 Language in social interaction
Suppose that in order to get at the social origins of language we would begin by
looking at language as it is employed in social interaction rather than looking at
language as linguists traditionally view it. We might expect that these patterns of
social interaction vary radically across cultures without signiﬁcant constraint. Inuit
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song duels, Wolof greetings, Iatmul Naven are just a few of the anthropologically
more famous forms that human social interaction takes (Eckert and Newmark 1980;
Irvine 1974; Bateson 1936). When seen in comparison with more familiar forms such
as found in English courtrooms, American presidential press-conferences, and
French family dinners, we may be impressed by apparently limitless diversity.
However, research on the basic structures of social interaction, which serve as a
chassis for linguistic behaviour, has shown that beneath such diversity is a robust,
universal, generic infrastructure that exploits a range of species-speciﬁc cognitive
abilities and prosocial motivations (Enﬁeld and Levinson 2006; Levinson 2006;
Schegloff 2006; Sidnell 2007; Tomasello 2008). This infrastructure is not some kind
of conversational equivalent of the mental module or device that has been proposed
to account for putative underlying commonalities among the grammars of the
world’s languages. The infrastructure being described here emerges from a combin-
ation of evolved cognitive capacities in the domain of sociality (in part speciﬁcally
human, though not speciﬁc to language) and the structural patterning that emerges
when social moves are made and counter-made, in the form of the kinds of few-
second chunks of behaviour we call utterances (see Enﬁeld 2013: chs 3 and 6). The
precise nature of this emergence is a major topic for research. The hypothesis is that
there is a universal underlying infrastructure for the use of language in interaction,
even when basic styles of human interaction seem to differ radically across groups—
compare, for example, norms of interaction in Japan versus Anglo America (Lebra
1976; Lebra and Lebra 1986; Wierzbicka 1991: 72ff ). The technical properties of this
infrastructure cannot be discovered by applying existing research tools of linguistics.
If research on the social origins of language is to be properly informed about the
object of study, then what is needed, as a complement to approaches to language
within the discipline of linguistics, are approaches that focus on (a) those aspects of
language that are unique to multi-unit sequences produced not by a single person but
by multiple people in a social interaction, i.e. conversation; and (b) those aspects of
cognition-for-language that are unique to the management of social relations rather
than to the conceptual management of information per se. Fortunately, these needs
are already met. There are established research traditions that provide resources for
studying language and cognition in just these ways. To date, however, they have
tended not to be well connected with linguistics, or cognitive science more generally,
partly for reasons of disciplinary afﬁliation: they exist as branches of anthropology
and sociology. They take an enchronic perspective on language, which is to say that
they look at language in the move-by-move ﬂow of interaction, as opposed to the
(also invaluable) perspectives of diachronic versus synchronic, and ontogenetic
versus phylogenetic (on enchrony, see Enﬁeld 2009a: 10, 2011: 285–91, and 2013). To
review these lines of research at any length would go beyond our present scope (see
e.g. Heritage and Atkinson 1984; Duranti and Goodwin 1992; Duranti 1997; Schegloff
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2006, 2007; Sidnell 2010; Sidnell and Enﬁeld 2012; Sidnell and Stivers 2012; Enﬁeld
et al. 2014). Here we merely want to point in their direction.
Current thinking about face-to-face interaction from an enchronic perspective
has been inﬂuenced by a variety of lines of research including linguistic pragmatics,
Peircean semiotics, as well as research in anthropology, psychology, and other
disciplines (see Enﬁeld 2013, and many references therein). Here we want to
highlight an approach to interaction that emerged in the work of Harvey Sacks,
Emanuel Schegloff, and Gail Jefferson and that has come to be known as conver-
sation analysis (Sacks 1992; Sacks et al. 1974; Sidnell 2010; Sidnell and Stivers 2012).
Both Sacks and Schegloff were students of Erving Goffman, a transdisciplinary
scholar who, although trained as a sociologist, had a major impact upon, and indeed
was himself strongly inspired by, anthropology (see especially Goffman 1964, 1967,
and 1971). Goffman was perhaps the ﬁrst, and certainly the most eloquent, defender
of the view that face-to-face interaction constituted its own phenomenon, that it
had properties which were sui generis and not reducible to individual psychology or
broader social processes (Goffman 1964). Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson incorpor-
ated this idea, and it may be understood as the ﬁrst pillar of conversation analysis
(see especially Schegloff 1968).
When Sacks and Schegloff were studying with Goffman at Berkeley, they were
inﬂuenced by the highly original studies of Harold Garﬁnkel and the approach he
developed known as ethnomethodology (Garﬁnkel 1967). The goal of Garﬁnkel’s
early studies was to uncover the underlying practices of reasoning which members of
a society use in accomplishing everyday activities and which ultimately make society
possible. A major part of Garﬁnkel’s investigations was taken up with the question of
how a person makes sense of another’s conduct including their talk. This concern
was incorporated into conversation analysis, as a kind of second pillar: the idea that
participants in social interaction engage in practical reasoning both to produce their
own talk and to understand the talk of others (see Heritage 1984). Both Goffman and
Garﬁnkel thus provided inspiration for a new and distinctive approach to the study
of ordinary social interaction. Others were left with the task of inventing a method by
which ordinary social interaction might be systematically studied.
Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson took up this challenge. They studied social inter-
action by listening to audio recordings of telephone calls as well as co-present
interaction, and there they found a locus of intricate order. Early studies showed
that an interaction can be analysed into parts and that these parts consist of deﬁnable
practices of speaking which have systematic effects and which together form orderly
sequences of action in interaction (Schegloff 1968; see also Schegloff 2006). This order
is not the product of statistical regularities or of categorical imperatives but rather of
a persistent and pervasive orientation by the participants to a set of structures or
norms. Like any set of norms in this sense, the norms that organize social interaction
do not determine conduct but rather provide a framework through which it is
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intelligible and through which it is evaluated (see Heritage 1984; Stivers et al. 2011).
Membership in any particular social group (e.g. German, Surgeon, Skateboarder)
requires that one be aware of, and unable to plausibly deny the existence of, a certain
set of norms, and thus to be accountable to those norms at every step. Participants in
interaction can then be seen—not only by analysts but, in the ﬁrst place, by other
participants—as following a rule, deviating from it, attempting but failing to follow it,
or simply violating it ﬂat out. These alternatives generate further informative infer-
ences about what that participant intends or means by behaving in that way (Sidnell
2010). The orderliness of interaction then is an endogenous product that is achieved
by participants in interaction in each and every one of its local instantiations through
the application of regular practices of reasoning.
Since the establishment of conversation analysis as a ﬁeld of empirically based
research on the structures of social action, a signiﬁcant literature has been produced.
The recent Handbook of Conversation Analysis (Sidnell and Stivers 2012) has a list of
some 2,000 bibliographical references. But from the point of view of linguistics and
other branches of cognitive science it is as if there were a hermetic seal around this
literature. In even the most sympathetic work in linguistics, there is little if any
connection to what is empirically known about the structure of human interaction,
nor to the social cognition that underlies it nor the situated use of language as a
cooperative activity. There are a few notable exceptions, for example in psycholin-
guistics (e.g. Clark 1996) and linguistic anthropology (e.g. Moerman 1988; Sidnell
2005), but surprisingly, in the language evolution literature that begins with the
social-relational functions of language (e.g. Dunbar 1996b; Dessalles 2009) this
large and directly relevant ﬁeld of research is overlooked.
8.3 Linguistic structures in social interaction
When we look at language in the context of its functions and distributions in social
interaction, the phenomenon takes on a new light. Over the last 20 years or so, a
group of linguists with functionalist afﬁliations have begun to yield new insights by
incorporating analytic concepts developed in conversation analysis, particularly
those of turn-taking and conversational sequence, in the analysis of traditional
linguistic topics. For example, Ford (1993) examines the grammatical structures
known as sentence-ﬁnal adverbial clauses in English and shows ways in which
their structure and distribution are not arbitrary but may be ‘interactionally gener-
ated’ (Ford 1993: 108 and passim). In the following example (1) the speaker S poses a
question, and when no uptake is forthcoming from the recipient R in the subsequent
line, S then adds the increment (in line 3), which in turn elicits the uptake from R (in
line 4) that lets S know they are being understood.
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(1) 1 S: Y’know when it– (.) came from the:: I think (a) air conditioning system, it
drips on the front of the ca:rs?
2 (0.1 second pause)
3 S: if you park in a certain place?
4 R: mm-hm
The increment produced in line 3 is grammatically ﬁtted to what came before it in line
1, but clearly lines 1 and 3were not produced as a whole unit, such as they might appear
to have been if cleaned up and written down on the page ( . . . it drips on the front of the
cars if you park in a certain place?). Rather, we see that in the real-time context of the
dyadic interaction, at line 2 some sort of conﬁrmation of understanding appears to
have been due from R, but there was silence instead. By then producing the increment
in line 3, S can continue as if the turn was not yet ﬁnished, thus getting another
opportunity to elicit a conﬁrmation of understanding, which indeed comes from R in
line 4 (see also Sidnell 2012). This type of study complements linguistic research on
grammatical structures by giving us a sense of the functions that such structures can
have in the enchronic social context of the speech event, as distinct from their
referential or representational relations to the event being narrated or described.
Another area is the study of the ‘procedural resources’ that languages provide for
managing talk (see Blakemore 1987, 2002; Schiffrin 1988; Clark 1996). All languages
have various kinds of ‘feedback markers’ (mm, uh-huh), ‘discourse markers’ (oh, so,
well, etc.), ‘trouble markers’ (um, uh), ‘editing expressions’ (I mean etc.), ‘repair
initiators’ (what? huh?), etc. Despite their ubiquity and importance in regulating the
ﬂow of interaction, these kinds of items are seldom studied in typological or cognitive
scientiﬁc approaches to language, where the tendency is to focus on the referential
functions of language. Upon inspection of data from conversation, it can be shown that
these types of items have distinct distributional properties in relation to formal patterns
of language use. For example, with regard to so-called ‘newsmarks’ in English (such as
Really?), Jefferson (cited in Heritage 1984: 340) shows that there are deﬁnable and
recurrent multi-turn sequences like the following: (Move 1) announcement of some
piece of new information by Speaker A (e.g. that she didn’t smoke any cigarettes);
(Move 2) Oh really? by Speaker B; (Move 3) reconﬁrmation by A; and ﬁnally (Move 4)
an evaluation or ‘assessment’ by B (e.g. Very good). This kind of pattern is not a
construction in any standard linguistic sense, but it clearly points to a kind of
interactional grammar associated with these procedural linguistic elements.
In some research, procedural items are not considered to be linguistic at all. Levelt
(1989: 484) looks at er as a marker of disﬂuency (similar to um, uh, etc.), and while he
shows that er has a speciﬁable function—signalling that ‘at the moment when trouble
is detected, the source of trouble is still actual or quite recent’—he concludes that it is
‘a symptom, not a sign’. By contrast, Jefferson (1974: 184) suggests that uh perhaps has
‘the status of a word in the English language’. The same has been argued by Clark and
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Fox Tree (2002), who found in a corpus study that um and uh show different
functional distributions in English. In addition, a quick look across languages reveals
that the precise form of such items is locally conventionalized: English has um while
Lao has ‘un’ (Enﬁeld 2007: 314). These kinds of procedural items do not have the
referential functions that linguists tend to privilege, but they are no less linguistic
for that.
In the sorts of approaches we have just reviewed, the researcher is either looking at
a familiar grammatical structure in the unfamiliar light of conversational sequence,
or is looking at a well-known but oft-marginalized element that can hardly be studied
at all without consulting conversational data. Then there are domains of structure
that are off the linguistic map altogether. These possibly universal and arguably
generic underlying components of the infrastructure for interaction, already alluded
to above, are organized into partially independent or semi-autonomous domains or
systems. We now want to draw attention to two of the most central of these systems,
which will need to be properly deﬁned and handled by any natural approach to
language as a form of social behaviour.
8.4 Turn-taking and sequence organization in conversation
An organized system of turn-taking provides for the orderly distribution of oppor-
tunities to participate in talk-in-interaction. Sacks et al. (1974) deﬁne the system as
having two components. A turn constructional component deﬁnes the units out of
which a possible turn can be constructed and by extension allow participants in
interaction to anticipate the possible/probable extent and shape of any actual unit
and thus to project or predict its completion. A turn allocation component speciﬁes
an organized set of practices by which transition from a current speaker to a next
speaker is managed. Together, these two components and the rules that organize the
relation between them, provide for the orderly or systematic nature of turn-taking in
interaction. Sometimes the system operates in such a way that we see seamless
transitions between speakers in a sequence. The following example from a telephone
call shows tight temporal alignment in ‘ﬂoor transition’ between the two speakers:
(2) (Rahman corpus A:1:VM:(4); transcription slightly simpliﬁed; transition meas-
urements in secs from de Ruiter et al. 2006)
(Begin call)
Mat: ‘lo Redcah ﬁve o’six one?,
Ver: [+0.15s] Hello Matthew is yer mum there love.
Mat: [+0.13s] Uh no she’s, gone (up) t’ town
Ver: [+0.24s] Al:right uh will yih tell’er Antie Vera rang then.
Mat: [–0.03s] Yeh.
Ver: [+0.13s] Okay. She’s alright is she.
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Mat: [+0.10s] Yeh
Ver: [+0.07s] Okay. Right. Bye bye luv,
Mat: [+0.02s] Tara,
(End call)
The turn-taking model suggests that people in a conversation will actively minimize
the amount of overlap in speech (i.e. they will avoid having two or more people
speaking simultaneously), and at the same time they will actively minimize the
amount of silence between turns in a sequence, as we have just seen. But having
such imperatives or ‘rules’ does not entail that all conversation actually proceeds one
speaker at a time. Overlaps and gaps occur constantly (Sacks et al. 1974; see also
Schegloff 2000: 47–8, n. 1), and these exceptions can have functional effects, arising
from the very fact that people perceive them as exceptions. It is sometimes suggested
that in this or that culture or social setting, a completely different system applies, or
that there is no system at all (for instance, ‘In Language/Culture X, people all talk
at the same time’; see Stivers et al. 2009: 10587). However, there are to date no
systematic empirical studies of informal conversation that provide counterexamples
to the claim of a one-speaker-at-a-time normative design for the regulation of
conversational turn-taking (Schegloff 2000: 2). As in many domains of linguistic
analysis, impressions and intuitions turn out not to be supported by empirical data
(see de Ruiter et al. 2006; Stivers et al. 2009). Sidnell (2001) tested Reisman’s (1974)
claim that everyday conversation in Antigua follows a ‘contrapuntal’ style, and found
that in fact the data are compatible with a one-speaker-at-a-time model.
It is common to observe overlapping speech in conversation, but rather than
constituting exceptions to the turn-taking rules, such cases usually provide evidence
in support of it. When people self-select as speakers of next turns, the system dictates
that they should begin speaking at a point where the previous speaker’s turn is
possibly complete and where transition to a new speaker is pragmatically relevant.
In example (3) below, left square brackets mark the onset of overlapping talk. Our
focus is on what happens at lines 4 and 5. After Old Man says ‘The funfair changed it’,
this is a point of possible completion of his utterance, and it is a point where
transition to a new speaker would be relevant. Parky twice attempts to begin his
turn ‘That changed it’ (before it is eventually produced in full at line 6), yet ﬁnds
himself in overlap on both occasions (line 5). Notice the split-second timing here
with Parky attempting to come in at just those points where Old Man has reached
possible (though obviously not actual) completion of his current turn. Clearly, in
order to come in at just these points, Parky must have anticipated where Old Man
would reach possible completion of his current turn.
(3) Parky
1 Tourist: Has the park changed much,
2 Parky: Oh yes,
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3 (1.0)
4 Old man: Th’ Funfair changed it’n [awful lot [didn’it.
5 Parky: [Th- [That-
6 Parky: That changed it,
(example from Sacks et al. 1974; transcription slightly simpliﬁed)
An important and widely underappreciated point is that this turn-taking system
operates independently of whatever social actions are being accomplished in and
through the talk it organizes—that is, whether people are requesting, inviting, ques-
tioning, answering, agreeing, disagreeing, complaining, excusing, insulting, or whatever
else they do in turns-at-talk constructed and distributed through the turn-taking
system. All of this supports the idea that the turn-taking system is part of an
infrastructure that operates ‘underneath’, and independent from, the goal-directed
social behaviour that people are effecting with their context-situated usage of language.
The arrangement of linguistically conducted social actions into sequences repre-
sents a distinct domain of organization in interaction, yet it presupposes an under-
lying turn-taking mechanism (Schegloff 1968, 2007). Many social actions that are
carried out through the use of language come in pairs, for example request and
granting (or rejection), invitation and acceptance (or refusal), complaint and excuse
(or denial), and so on. These pairs are linked together by a relation of conditional
relevance whereby, to paraphrase Schegloff, given a ﬁrst action (such as a request,
invitation, or complaint), a second action is made expectable. Upon the occurrence of
a second it can be seen to be a second item to the ﬁrst (rather than an independent
turn) and upon its non-occurrence it can be seen to be absent (where an inﬁnite
number of other things did not occur but are not absent in the same way; Schegloff
1968). Conditional relevance thus establishes a relation between a ﬁrst and second
action that has both a prospective and a retrospective dimension. The prospective
dimension ensures that the doing of a ﬁrst action will activate a norm making
the doing of the second action relevant and noticeably absent if not produced. This
norm draws on a cooperative assumption in social interaction. The retrospective
dimension allows the speaker of the ﬁrst to see if, and how, she was understood.
For example, if someone produces a responsive utterance that is recognizable as
an excuse, this will reveal to the ﬁrst speaker that she was apparently heard to be
complaining or accusing, whether that was her intention or not. Thus the production
of actions within sequences constitutes an architecture of intersubjectivity by which
understandings are publically displayed and ratiﬁed incarnately, en passant in the
course of whatever business the talk is occupied with (Heritage 1984; Clark 1996).
Episodes of talk-in-interaction can, typically, be described in terms of base
sequences (often adjacency pairs) and their frequently multiple pre-, insert-, and
post-expansions (Schegloff 2007). Such expansions are also made up of sequences
and these may be the loci of their own expansions. Thus a maximally simple ordering
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of utterances into adjacency pairs can nevertheless result in sequences of considerable
complexity, again implying a kind of structured grammar of interaction, of clear
importance to the social origins of language and yet unknown to the science of
linguistics.
If we take the elements of the turn-taking system and the action sequences that
ride upon it and incorporate them into our understanding of language structure, this
can give us new insights into the function and distribution of the kinds of lexico-
grammatical structures that linguists normally want to explain. One of the central
features of conversational sequences, as just described, is the notion that utterances
are not just produced as conversational moves in a ﬂat string, but rather are related to
each other in speciﬁc ways. Most important among such inter-move relations is the
relation between initiating utterances and responsive utterances. A simple example of
an initiating utterance is a question: it initiates one person’s local project (e.g. it is a
means to achieve a person’s goal to get a piece of information that they need prior to
some next action, such as when I ask you the time so I can know whether I need to
run for the train or not), and obliges another person to join this local project and, if
possible, cooperate by providing the required information (see example (3), Q = ‘Has
the park changed much,’ A = ‘Oh yes,’). Many other kinds of two-turn sequences
have this kind of structure, where the ﬁrst move puts an obligation on another person
to provide a next move of a certain type (see discussion above).
Linguists seldom invoke turn or sequence structure in carrying out core linguistic
research, but recent attempts to do just this have yielded good results. Gipper (2011)
examines a set of grammatical markers of evidentiality in Yurakaré (a language
isolate of Central Bolivia), of the kind that have proven notoriously difﬁcult to pin
down in semantic and pragmatic analysis. Gipper draws on data from Yurakaré
conversation, which allows her to use sequential position as a factor in the analysis.
She distinguishes cases in which a certain evidential is used in an initiating type of
turn in a conversational sequence from cases in which it is used in a responding type
of turn. She ﬁnds that the different effects or meanings of evidential markers can be
deﬁned in terms of the conversational position (and, relatedly, the action type) they
occur in.
Earlier research used these pair–part asymmetries of conversational sequence as a
way to account for the distribution of certain kinds of lexical and grammatical
structures, while bringing in more explicit reference to the social elements of
speakers’ rights and duties in producing different kinds of utterances. Pomerantz
(1984) discovered some ways in which an utterance can set up a preference structure
that constrains the ways in which another person can respond (Pomerantz and
Heritage 2012). For example, when a person issues an invitation, the linguistic
structure of the response will be different depending on whether it is an acceptance
or a rejection. In the case of accepting, which we can regard as the socially preferred,
cooperative response to an invitation, the response normally comes without delay
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and in simple form, as shown in example (4a). By contrast, in the case of declining,
which we can regard as the relatively non-cooperative, socially marked response to an
invitation, the response has a set of formal properties that are not observed in the
acceptance, namely delay, prefacing with ‘discourse markers’ like well, markers of
disﬂuency or hesitation, and the provision of accounts or reasons for the declination,
as shown in example (4b):
(4) (a) i. Do you want to go for a drink?
ii. Sounds good!
(b) i. Do you want to go for a drink?
ii. (pause) Um, well, I kinda still have work to do, so maybe um. . . .
A series of studies have subsequently examined these issues of preference, where the
social-interactional factors at play at a given moment in the interaction can account
for why a particular grammatical structure has been selected at all, accounting thus
for both the speciﬁc function and distribution of a grammatical device which might
otherwise go unexplained (Pomerantz 1984; Pomerantz and Heritage 2012; Heritage
and Raymond 2005; Sidnell and Enﬁeld 2012, among many others). These kinds of
features of preference structure have two important properties that put them outside
the scope of most linguistic research. Firstly, they are explained in terms of inherently
social-interactional factors such as the degree to which an utterance constitutes a
cooperative action, as opposed to an action that resists the trajectory that another
person has set out on. Secondly, they are inherently enchronic, being deﬁned in terms
of speciﬁc positions in conversational sequence—initiating versus responsive—which
cannot be studied without looking at data from conversation. Conversation is a type
of data that is seldom studied in linguistics, including the kinds of linguistics that
have currency in research on language evolution.
8.5 Repair
A second system of practices for the use of language in interaction is the system for
repair (Schegloff et al. 1977). In using language in human interaction, there is always
the possibility that troubles will arise in speaking, hearing, and understanding (Levelt
1983; Clark 1996; Schegloff 2006; Hayashi et al. 2013). An organized set of practices of
repair constitutes a natural, interactive system by which such troubles may be
addressed at or near the point where they occur, and may be potentially resolved
more or less immediately before there is intolerable divergence of the participants’
intersubjective understandings of what is going on in the interaction. Research on the
practices of repair have shown it to be a structured and systematic domain, as if
repair had a grammar all its own; though again, this system has remained outside of
the usual purview of linguistics.
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The analysis of repair in interaction makes reference to several kinds of distin-
guishing structural features. Firstly, there are distinctions in the components of the
repair sequence, listed in (5):
(5) Components of a repair sequence
A. Trouble source or repairable = some element of an utterance that consti-
tutes a source of trouble, for any of a range of reasons including problems of
production, word choice, hearing, and appropriateness, relevance, among
other possible problems.
B. Signal of trouble = a sign that there is a source of trouble, including the
manifest nature of the trouble itself as well as techniques for drawing
attention to the trouble.
C. Initiation of repair = a sign that the trouble will be, or should be, ﬁxed; often
is formulated in such a way as to identify and/or characterize the trouble
source.
D. Repair = a correction or redoing of the trouble in (A).
Secondly, there are distinctions in the personnel involved in the repair sequence. The
speaker of the trouble source turn is often referred to as ‘self ’ (e.g. in the term self-
repair), though this person may or may not be the one to produce some other
component of the sequence; for instance, a major class of repair sequences is called
other-initiation of repair. This refers to cases in which a problem in one person’s
utterance is signalled by another person in a subsequent turn, and is subsequently
repaired by the original speaker, as shown in the following example:
(6) Other-initiation of repair in a 3-turn sequence
Trouble source B: Oh Sibbie’s sistuh had a baby boy
Initiation of repair A: Who?
Repair B: Sibbie’s sister.
(example from Schegloff et al. 1977: 376–8; transcription slightly simpliﬁed)
Thirdly, there are distinctions in the possible positions in a ‘repair opportunity space’
at which the different components can be observed, and where different personnel
can be involved:
(7) Positions in the repair opportunity space: ‘3 turns long’, 4 main positions
A. Same turn = within the turn that includes the ‘trouble source’ (T1)
B. Transition space = at completion of T1, when turn transition is relevant/
possible
C. Next turn = in the turn that follows T1 (T2)
D. Third turn/position = in the turn that follows next turn (with complexities
left aside here)
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Together, these three sets of distinctions—the components, personnel, and positions
of a repair sequence—deﬁne a possibility space for how any repair sequence might
emerge or be generated in a given stretch of social interaction. A solid literature has
begun to make inroads into mapping out the many possible structures and functions
of repair sequences, mostly with a focus on English. Much more work needs to be
done, not only on continuing to describe the grammar of repair and determine the
extent to which it constitutes a system, but also to carry out the necessary cross-
linguistic comparative work (see Hayashi et al. 2013, and references therein, for steps
in this direction).
8.6 Conclusion
We have introduced a couple of the most important contributions of pioneering
research on talk-in-interaction over the last 30 years or so. A key feature of this line of
work is that it has effectively taken an ethological approach to the use of language in
human behaviour, but has not suffered from one of the central problems of human
ethology, namely the problem of proceeding as if our possession of language doesn’t
make enough of a difference that we should study people any differently from how
we study animals. We are of course animals, and we are not excused from being
studied as such (Tiger and Fox 1966). But let’s face it, language changes things a lot.
We have argued that to get a direct view of how language works in social terms,
an enchronic perspective is required, a causal frame in which the moves we build
from bits of language (and much else) are embedded in trajectories of joint activity
that necessarily involve multiple parties and that necessarily have social causes and
consequences. Technically deﬁned systems for interaction such as turn-taking and
repair seem to transcend language, and yet they are so closely bound up with it that
we might ultimately expect some kind of a co-evolutionary account. That said, to
have been able to get language up and running as we know it today, it seems to us
that the fundamentals of the infrastructure for interaction would have to have been in
place ﬁrst. This implies, as many have suggested (e.g. Tomasello 2006), that if our
closest relatives lack certain key capacities for the shared intentionality that enables
the most basic sequences of human interaction, this would account for why they also
don’t have language, and can’t get it. It seems clear that in the realm of vocal
communication (see Clay and Zuberbühler, Chapter 11), other apes do not show
anything like the responsive, contingent turn-taking behaviour so characteristic of
human interaction (Arcadi 2000); though we note that in the realm of visible bodily
behaviours such as ritualized gestures, there are patterns of behaviour that do more
closely resemble the kernels of adjacency–pair sequences (Rossano, F. 2012). So
what’s now needed is more empirical research. The ﬁrst pass that conversation
analysis has carried out over recent decades was an important initial step toward
developing a rigorous account of the enchronic infrastructure for interaction. By
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determining the systems or domains out of which talk-in-interaction is composed,
and upon which language usage rides, this work has uncovered some fundamental
areas upon which entire research programmes can now be based.
Subsequent research will have to explore implications for language evolution of the
idea that language presupposes an enchronic infrastructure for social interaction.
If language is not possible without such an infrastructure, then the question of
language evolution turns to the evolutionary origins of the infrastructure itself. An
important issue for subsequent work will be to test the extent of human diversity in
the basic structures of interaction. Recent work from an anthropological and cross-
linguistic perspective has begun to ask whether the particular language being spoken
has consequences for the organization of interaction as described here (see Sidnell
2009; Dingemanse and Floyd 2014). That research is in its infancy but initial results
suggest that the underlying, generic structures of interaction may be inﬂected or
torqued by the particular semiotic structures through which interaction is accom-
plished, as well as the local circumstances within which it operates. Sidnell and
Enﬁeld (2012) explore the idea that the distinct lexico-syntactic resources of a
language can have distinct collateral effects on the ways in which certain types of
social action can play out in sequences of conversation.
Our goal in this chapter has been to draw attention to some aspects of language
that inhabit the divide between the established reference-oriented, sentence-based
interests of linguistics, on the one hand, and the social-relational concerns of research
on human sociality, on the other. Linguistics has achieved an enormous amount, yet
it still struggles to connect with social cognition and social behaviour in ways that
other disciplines can apprehend and apply. We submit that this problem can be
readily solved in research on the social origins of language, thanks to the existence of
a signiﬁcant body of literature that provides the much-needed link between language
and human sociality.
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